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EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE BUCK STops HERE
By EDWARD J. KIONKA*
INTRODUCTION

American law schools and law teachers-which for most purposes are pretty much the same thing-are being charged these
days with an amazing variety of sins. Many of these are charges
which we have brought against ourselves, which is a healthy sign.
It is interesting to note, however, that it seems to be mainly our
brethren at the bar who maintain that we are deficient in educating our graduates in matters of professionalism and professional
responsibility.
In fact, not only has it been alleged that we are not doing
enough-it has been decreed that we shall do better. At its midyear meeting in January 1973, the American Bar Association
adopted a new set of Standardsfor the Approval of Law Schools,
substantially in the form recommended by the report of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar. However, the
proposed Standards were amended on the floor of the House of
Delegates to provide that henceforth:
[All A.B.A. approved law schools] shall offer .

.

. and provide and

require for all student candidates for a professional degree, instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession.'

It is not yet known, of course, how much of such instruction is
enough, and what forms it may take. If anything other than nominal compliance is required, most law schools will have to undertake to increase substantially their activities in this respect.
The law schools' lack of enthusiasm for education in professional responsibility is not a recent development. Some 40 years
ago Professor Elliott Cheatham wrote:
The subject, What the Law Schools Can Do to Raise the Standards
of the Legal Profession, is not fashionable among law teachers. The
feelings of most of us toward it range from a high of mild interest to
a low of complete hostility. These attitudes find expression in the
*Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; B.S., 1960,
University of Illinois; J.D., 1972, University of Illinois College of Law; LL.M., 1973, Columbia University School of Law.
'AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS BY THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION § 302(a)(iii) (1973).
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slur the subject is beneath our notice, and again in the assertion it
2
is so important as to transcend our powers.

Other writers have echoed this observation. 3 Why is this so?
In part, ambivalence arises from the schizophrenic nature of
legal education itself. On the one hand, the law school sees itself
as a part of the whole academic enterprise of higher education.
In this sense, it disdains concern with matters relating to the
delivery of legal services; its academic mission is to pass on the
fundamental verities of the law and to lead the exploration of the
frontiers of legal knowledge. At the same time, however, the law
school also serves as the exclusive route to the bar. At least from
the standpoint of the overwhelming majority of law students, the
end product of the process of legal education must be a person
who is adequately prepared to don the professional mantle and
to assume responsibility for the legal health of others.4
Since 90 weeks are obviously insufficient time to prepare the
complete lawyer, the law schools compromise. The justifications
employed are persuasive: We cannot teach all the law, although
we do try to expose students to a great deal of it so that they will
be able to see a legal issue camouflaged in a haystack of raw facts.

We try to teach some of the necessary verbal and mental skills
so that they will know how to dissect a legal problem and how to
'Cheatham, What the Law Schools Can Do to Raise the Standards of the Legal
Profession, 7 AM. L. SCH. REv. 716 (1933).
'Bradway, Making Ethical Lawyers-Some Practical Proposals for Achieving the
Goal, 24 GEO. L.J. 345, 359-60 (1936); Elliott, What the Law Schools Can or Should Do,
in SErON HALL CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 33-37 (1956); Fuller, What the
Law Schools Can Contributeto the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 189, 202-03 (1948);
Mathews, The Public Responsibilitiesof the Academic Law Teacher, 14 J. LEGAL ED. 97,
98-99 (1961); Starrs, Crossing a PedagogicalHellespont Via the Pervasive System, 17 J.
LEGAL ED. 365 (1965); Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REv. 392, 39395 (1971); Thurman, A.A.L.S. PresidentialAddress, in 1962 AALS PROCEEDINGs 63, 66;
Watson, Some PsychologicalAspects of Teaching ProfessionalResponsibility, 16 J. LEGAL
ED. 1 (1963); Weckstein, Training for Professionalism, 4 CONN. L. REv. 409 (1971-72).
'In 1970, out of 324,818 lawyers accounted for in the United States, 276,571 (85.1%)
were active in the private sector (practice or private employment). To this must be added
those government lawyers (city, state, and federal) who engage in the practice of law.
These figures are not separately available, but since there were 35,803 lawyers (11.1%)
listed as "legislative and executive" governmental employees and 5.2% of lawyers are
retired or inactive, even allowing for some overlap between the private and public sectors,
it would seem reasonable to assume that something over 90% of all lawyers are engaged
in the practice of law and must deal with professional responsibility issues. It is also
interesting to note that slightly less than half of all lawyers in private practice are sole
practitioners. AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 10-12 (1972).
See Smith, Is Education for ProfessionalResponsibility Possible?, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 509
(1968).
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be advocates, judges, arbiters, and advisers. When asked to summarize what we do, we say that we do not purport to teach our
students "the law," or how to practice law, but merely "how to
think like a lawyer." We teach what we hope is enough to provide
adequate fuel for such thought, and we hope that one learns to
practice law properly by practicing law.
What, then, of education about professionalism and professional responsibility? To say that the law schools as a whole have
officially ignored these subjects would be slightly overstating the
matter. Most have at least made available a course, a seminar,
or a few lectures. ' Occasionally, such things are discussed in law
courses.' Some schools have relied mainly on a presumption that
such education occurs through osmosis.7 As Felix Frankfurter
said, speaking of the Harvard Law School:
There weren't any courses on ethics, but the place was permeated by ethical presuppositions and assumptions and standards.
On the whole, to this day I am rather leery of explicit ethical instruction.'

But whatever a law school's program, most law students and
faculty can testify that the glowing generalities in law school
catalogues about the importance of the role and responsibilities
of the lawyer have rarely been translated in corresponding proportion into the daily life of curriculum and cocurricular programs. 9
'See L.

RESPONSIBILITY: A SURVEY OF CUR(1963).
On the basis of an analysis of the 1972 Directory of Law Teachers, it would appear
that not more than three-fourths of all A.A.L.S. member schools currently offer a course
on "the legal profession" (which is defined to include courses in law and public opinion,
legal education, legal ethics, preventive law, professional responsibility, and the lawyer
as negotiator). A.A.L.S., 1972 DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 754-56. At about 72 of the 92
or so schools offering one or more such courses, the courses are taught by law teachers who
have been teaching them for five years or less.
Lamborn found that at 84 percent of the schools offering a course, it was required for
graduation. L. LAMBORN, supra at 4. However, a survey of current law school catalogues
indicates that today only a minority of schools have such a requirement.
Compare Cheatham, The Inculcation of ProfessionalStandards and the Functions of
the Lawyer, 21 TENN. L. REv. 812, 814-20 (1951) with EDUCATION INTHE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBITmES OF THE LAWYER (D. Weckstein ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as BOULDER
II].
LAMBORN, LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL

RENT METHODS OF INSTRUCTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS

'See L.

LAMBORN,

supra note 5.

'Malone, The Sine Qua Non of Legal Education, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 7, 10 (1959);
Thurman, supra note 3, at 63.
PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 19 (1960).
'Malone, supra note 7, at 10.

1H.

[So many of them [law review editors] in listing shortcomings of legal
education, which they were asked to do, referred in varying ways to the
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Yet our professional consciences continue to prod us to seek
a better answer. We sense that a real gap exists between what
we say a lawyer is in brochures and Law Day speeches and
what the curriculum says he is. The real question is, to what
extent can we justify the crowding or displacement of law materials in an already crowded curriculum in favor of materials on
professionalism?
Faced with these uncertainties, we have naturally resorted to
the time-honored devices used by groups in all civilized societies
when they do not know how to handle a problem-we have held
conferences and conducted surveys. Beginning in 191510 and culminating in 1962 with the most recent comprehensive survey by
the American Bar Foundation," we have tried to determine what
the law schools are actually doing." To the extent that these
surveys are mostly based upon reading law school catalogue descriptions, their validity is open to serious question. However,
even assuming them to be accurate, they reveal a wide variation
in the quantity and techniques of professional responsibility education. Significantly, despite years of experience and experimentation in these matters, there was widespread dissatisfaction with
the quantity and quality of efforts explicit and implicit in the
1962 A.B.F. survey.'" In general, these dissatisfactions stemmed
from doubts as to the relative effectiveness of any given method
or combination of methods of instruction, as illustrated in part
by their diversity and instability. In these surveys, as well as
other writings on this subject, there are frequent overtones of
uncertainty and frustration-uncertainty as to how and how
much, and frustration caused by the desire to have an effective
program without knowing how to do so."
failure of law schools to paint the broad picture of the legal profession.
Thurman, supra note 3, at 66. See also Weckstein, Boulder II: Why and How?, in BOULDER
II at 12; Cheatham, supra note 5, at 814-20; Kingsley, Teaching Professional Ethics and
Responsibilities: What the Law Schools Are Doing, 7 J. LEGAL ED. 84 (1954); Mathews,
supra note 3, at 97-100; Samad, The PervasiveApproach to TeachingProfessionalResponsibility, 26 OHIo ST. L.J. 100 (1965); Stevens, ProfessionalResponsibility-theRole of the
Law School and the Bar, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 203 (1953); Van Hecke, Education for Professional
Responsibility, 17 LA. L. REV. 513 (1957).
1Bond, PresentInstructionin Professional Ethics in Law Schools, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV.
40 (1915).
"L. LAMBORN, supra note 5.
21931 AALS HANDBOOK 97; 1934 AALS HANDBOOK 189; 1951 AALS PROCEEDINGS 167;
1958 AALS PROCEEDINGS 169; 1959 AALS PROCEEDINGS 98; 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoy,
CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 21-45, 206-08
3 See generally L. LAMBORN, supra note
5.
4

(1953).

' See 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoy, supra note 12, at 21-45, 206-08; L.

LAMBORN,

supra note
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Unsure of where we are and where we ought to be going, we
have held scholarly conferences and published their proceedings. 5 The grandest of these were held at the University of Colorado in 1956 and 1968 and have come to be known as Boulder 116
and Boulder II' respectively. Boulder II represents the culmination of the resurgence of academic interest in this topic which
began with the reactivation of the A.A.L.S. Committee on Education for Professional Responsibility in 1955.18 In addition to these
conference reports and proceedings, which themselves virtually
exhaust the subject in all of its nuances, there are literally
hundreds of articles, books, and book reviews which offer all of
the various views and reviews one could imagine. 9 If the minds
of legal educators remain undeveloped on this subject, it is not
for lack of available nourishment.
Surely at this point in time, standing on the summit of this
mountain of information, we ought to have a clearer view than
ever before of the ways and means of professional responsibility
education. Yet all of us who labor in the vineyards of legal education can take judicial notice of the fact that our historic apathy
and uncertainty have persisted. To be sure, there are a few dedicated enthusiasts, mainly those who attend the conferences and
write the books and articles, but the sparks struck at Boulder
seemingly have not yet kindled a larger flame of interest among
the rank and file of legal educators.
5; Cheatham, supra note 5, at 814-20.
"In addition to BOULDER I and BOULDER II (see notes 16 and 17 infra and accompanying text), we have had the A.B.A.-A.A.L.S. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility (ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958));
the Asheville Conference of Law School Deans on Education for Professional Responsibility (PROCEEDINGS - THE ASHEVILLE CONFERENCE OF LAW SCHOOL DEANS ON EDUCATION FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY (H. Sacks ed. 1966)); the Seton Hall Conference on Profes-

sional Responsibility (1956); and the University of Chicago Conference on the Profession
of Law and Legal Education (1952); several interdisciplinary conferences (e.g., DAVIS,
EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1948); DeCapriles, A Report on the InterProfession Conference, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 175 (1948)); and several roundtables at A.A.L.S.
annual meetings (see, e.g., Symposium on Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. L. RaV.
409 (1971-72); A Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Symposium, 33
TENN. L. REV. 129 (1966)).
"J. STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY (1959).
"BOULDER II. Many of the articles presented at the conference may, in addition, be
found in Symposium on Education in the ProfessionalResponsibilities of the Lawyer, 41
U. COLO. L. REv. 303 (1969).
"See 1956 AALS PROCEEDINGS 88; 1963 AALS PROCEEDINGS 144.
"The bibliography included in BOULDER H at 359-401, contains 347 items. This is the
most comprehensive and useful bibliography in this field, although it is not exhaustive.
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Why? Each of us, obviously, will have his own reasons. Professor Cheatham observed:
The wide indifference of law teachers to the subject has many
sources. The feeling comes in part from an objection to Pharisaism.
If the place of the teacher carried with it the title of exemplar, no
one of us would serve. But immaculateness is no more essential here
than is infallibility.
The indifference toward the field comes, in great part, from the
fact we gain more pleasure from the wholly intellectual puzzles than
we do from intricate problems containing broader and more difficult
elements. As a result, we have relegated to the unfashionable all
elements of a lawyer's equipment other than the intellectual, and
tradition and the pressure to conform have held most of us within
the limits of the fashionable.
Lastly, the feeling comes from the belief that law schools can
do nothing about it. Here, I think we have erred in emphasizing the
disadvantages of our position and minimizing the advantages. It is
true our students are mature and on many sides the moulds are set.
It is equally true they are new to law and have a professional motive
and drive that create new habits of study and of thought. We can
as easily direct them to an intelligent consideration of professional
standards as to the Rule in Shelley's Case."

No doubt his observations remain valid today. Perhaps the root
causes of our disinterest are more fundamental and include one
or more of the following:
(1)

An overly narrow view of the meaning of "pro-

fessional responsibility";
(2)
The absence of a conviction that education for
professional responsibility is a proper or necessary func-

tion of the law school;
(3)

Lack of information about teaching methods;

and

(4) Lack of motivation to become personally involved in education for professional responsibility.
Formidable as they may seem, however, these attitudinal

and informational gaps are not impossible to bridge. It is true, of
course, that necessity is the mother both of invention and motivation, and to the extent that more must be done in order to comply
with the A.B.A. Standards, it can and will be done. There are

other and better reasons for shaking off our historic apathy and
"Cheatham, supra note 2, at 718.
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making education for professional responsibility a full-fledged
member of the curricular family.
I. THE MEANING OF "PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY"
In the case of some law teachers, antipathy toward education
for professional responsibility is based in large part upon a misconception as to the meaning of that term. In their minds, "professional responsibility" is limited to the lawyer's duty to refrain
from the more flagrant violations of the Canons of Ethics and
conjures up an image of a wicked reprobate who has stolen his
client's funds or lied to the court. Since, obviously, the law school
cannot teach morality and save souls,21 that is the end of the
matter.
Of course, that is far too narrow a view. There are at least
four components of a lawyer's professional responsibility:"
1. The obligation of professional competence. It is fundamental that the lawyer must possess adequate knowledge, skills,
and self-discipline to undertake to deal with the legal rights of
others.2 : The nature of the lawyer's role requires that he speak for
others in a language they can only dimly understand. The laymen
whose legal rights the lawyer affects can judge his work product
only in a very general way, and often not until long after he has
acted. His adversary in a given matter, if any, is not likely to
point out mistakes or incompetence. In most cases, he sets his
own standards of performance, and he is answerable only to his
own conscience for the quality of his work.2"
2

'Chadbourn, High Ethical Standardsand ProfessionalIdeals-TheProblem of Inculcation at the Student Level, 51 THE BRIEF 17, 18 (1955); Thurman, supra note 3, at 66;
Wirtz, Training for Professional Competence and Responsibility, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 461
(1961). This argument is well refuted in Weckstein, supra note 9, at 14-18.
"Numerous articles discuss the meaning and scope of professional responsibility. See,
e.g., Countryman, The Scope of the Lawyer's ProfessionalResponsibility, 26 OHIO ST. L.J.
66 (1965); Craig, Ethical Responsibilities of the Individual Lawyer, 17 ARK. L. REv. 288
(1963); Drinker, The Ethical Lawyer, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 375 (1954); Hurst, The Legal
Profession, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 967; McDougal, Education for ProfessionalResponsibility,
12 STUDENT LAWYE J. 6 (1966); Nutting, The Emerging Lawyer and Legal Education, 16
AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1966); Ringer, The Lawyer's Obligationto be Competent, 50 A.B.A.J.
235 (1964); Stason, Why a Profession?, 21 LA. L. REv. 153 (1960); Vanderbilt, The Five
Functions of the Lawyer: Service to Clients and the Public, 40 A.B.A.J. 31 (1954); Wade,
Public Responsibilities of the Learned Professions, 21 LA. L. Rv. 130 (1960). The text
represents this author's own distillation of their components. Also, see generally BOULDER
H; Currie, Reflections on the Course in the Legal Profession, 22 J. LEGAL ED. 48 (1969).
'See King, A Neglected Responsibility, in BOULDER I at 277.
"Watson, Canons as Guides to Action: Trustworthy or Treacherous, 33 TENN. L. REv.
162, 163 (1966).
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The law school can teach this aspect of professional responsibility, if at all, only indirectly. Perhaps it is instilled by the insistence upon high standards of performance in the classroom, in
writing assignments, and on examinations.25 Or perhaps it is
mostly the product of the character development which each student brings to law school, and is little influenced by anything in
the educational process."6 In any event, it may be useful for the
law teacher to bear in mind and profess the attitude that a selfimposed standard of competence is a necessary attribute of a
responsible professional.
2. The obligation to know and follow transactionalrules of
conduct. As most lawyers and law teachers should know, the
American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics were
superseded in 1969 by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
now adopted in most states. 2 The new Code is similar to the old
Canons in that it consists mainly of rules governing the lawyer's
conduct in dealing with his clients, other lawyers, and the courts,
usually in the context of specific cases or matters which the lawyer has been retained to handle. For convenience, these will be
referred to as "transactional rules." It is these rules to which most
people refer when they use the term "legal ethics."28 Termed the
rules of "ethics and etiquette," in general they are limitations
on conduct arising out of the fiduciary aspects of the lawyer's role.
There would seem to be no reason why these transactional
rules cannot be taught to law students just as we teach any other
body of legal rules. In effect they are just that-a system of legal
nIn this respect, one wonders whether there has been a general decline in the quantity
and quality of student input into the education process, in spite of (or possibly in part
because of) the increased level of the paper qualifications of those recently admitted to
law schools. If so, what effect will this have upon the self-imposed standards of professional competence of the next generation of lawyers as a whole?
"In this respect, one wonders whether law school grades do not reflect, to an extent,
each student's own standards of professional performance. If so, are they not at least in
part a valid means of assessing a student's attainment of the necessary standards of
professional competence?
rSee Sutton, Re-Evaluation of the Canons of ProfessionalEthics: A Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132, 136 (1966). A new Code of Judicial Conduct has now been
developed and its adoption is being urged. See Weckstein, Thode & Grossman, Round
Table Discussions on the Proposed Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 785
(1972); ABA Unit Seeks Adoption of JudicialCode by States, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin,
Nov. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
'Chadbourn, supra note 21, at 19.
"See id.; Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 455
(1972).
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rules which happen to apply to lawyers themselves instead of
their clients. Indeed, they are just as teachable as "the Rule in
Shelley's Case."
While the substantive differences between the old Canons
and the new Code are not great, the Code's organization should
facilitate the teaching of these transactional rules. The Code consists of three parts: (1) nine "Canons," which are very broad, onesentence statements of general principles-e.g., "A lawyer should
assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal
profession"; (2) a series of mandatory "Disciplinary Rules" under
each canon which set forth the minimum level of conduct below
which the lawyer cannot fall without being subject to discipline
(i.e., the professional rules of law); and (3) a series of "Ethical
Considerations" under each canon, higher norms which "are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive." 30 Thus, for the first
time, recognition is given to the dichotomy between the minimum level of acceptable conduct and the higher ideals which are
enforceable only by the conscience of the lawyer himself. The
Canons confused these, and the Code's distinction between the
two levels of rules should help to make education about the Code
more realistic and meaningful.
3. The obligation to understand and improve the legal
profession.31 Every freshman law student knows that he is an
apprentice member of an elite society-the legal profession. For
some, this is probably a significant motivating factor in their
decision to study law. Clearly, in order to function with maximum effectiveness as a member of this society, one must understand its functions, structure, and goals. What is the "bar"?
What distinguishes the legal profession from any other trade or
business? What are the benefits and burdens of membership in
this exclusive guild? What are the individual lawyer's responsibilities to the group? In other words, who are we?" These are
questions which every law student and lawyer confronts, and the
answers are not deducible by a priori reasoning.
Moreover, the legal profession as an institution is being sub"A.B.A., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969).

"Curiously, this aspect of professional responsibility is often ignored in the literature.
But see Arthurs, The Study of the Legal Profession in the Law School, 8 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 183 (1970).
"See id.
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jected to strong pressures for change.3 3 Fee schedules are being
challenged. Group legal services for the poor have given a new
dimension to many legal disputes, and experiments in group legal
services for the middle class are being conducted. Both of these
drastically alter the traditional structures for the delivery of legal
services and will have far-reaching effects on the future practice
of law. Plans are being developed for the recognition and certification of practice specialties. The necessity and validity of bar
examinations are being questioned. Young lawyers are challenging the structure of the bar associations and, in some cases, creating new associations of their own which parallel the existing organizations but have conflicting positions on many issues.'
Most would agree that the lawyer has an obligation to participate in needed reforms of his profession, to promote constructive
change which is in the public interest, and to devote some of his
time to the work of the organized bar. But to do these things well
and in a lawyer-like fashion, the lawyer ought to understand his
profession's structure and history and have a sound working
knowledge of the facts underlying the issues which the profession
must resolve.
Again, as in the case of transactional rules of conduct, the
legal profession as an institution is a subject which surely lends
itself to law school instruction as well as any other.
4. The obligation to facilitatejustice for all. Lawyers, individually and collectively, are the trustees of our legal system. As
such, the burden is upon them to see that the system functions
with maximum efficiency and fairness. They have a duty to work
to achieve constructive law reform and to improve the administration of the courts and all other adjudicatory and legislative
institutions. As the guardians of the sacred principle of due process, they must see that adequate legal services are made available to the poor and the unpopular. 5 Their training and experi"See Weckstein, supra note 3, at 409-11; Weinstein, supra note 29, at 463-66.
"For example, the new Chicago Council of Lawyers, composed mainly of young
reform-minded lawyers, has grown rapidly in membership and has recently obtained a
seat in the A.B.A. House of Delegates, displacing a seat held by the Illinois State Bar
Association.
"See Wirtz, supra note 21, at 463:
A second illustrative question of "responsibility" has to do with the
supplying of representation to those who seek it. The Canons do little more
here than recognize a professional ideal of adequate representation to all
responsible interests. Nor is any absolute rule practical.
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ence are deemed especially good preparation for public service,
and with such expertise goes the duty to answer the call to public
leadership and public service as required.
It is doubtful that this aspect of professional responsibility
can be "taught" in any meaningful way by direct methods. 3 Law
students, especially those beyond their first year, are not receptive to sermons. Some believe that clinical programs may help to
instill these ideals,3 7 although opinions to the contrary are not
without weight. Those who elect to participate in such programs
are usually the students who are most public service oriented, and
it has been observed that the negative aspects of clinical work
with poor clients can have a backlash effect unless the student is
already strongly committed in principle before he undertakes
38
such work.
This is not to say, however, that public service responsibilities cannot be taught at all. For example, faculty attitudes which
support these principles can be expressed at appropriate times,
with the result that students will tend to emulate them. 31 Some
faculty will themselves participate in public service work, law
reform, and extensions of legal services, thereby reinforcing the
role model effect. Perhaps the mere existence of certain kinds of
clinical and minority group programs sponsored by the law school
will be perceived as an affirmation of the law school's commitment to these ideals.
II.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AN ADEQUATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

PROGRAM

It is not enough for a law faculty merely to be aware of the
full scope of the principles and ideals of professional responsibility. Nor is it sufficient if they also realize-as they surely
do-that most of their students will encounter professional responsibility problems frequently during their professional lives. If
"Clark, How Far Can Professional Competence and Responsibility Be Taught?, 13
J. LEGAL ED. 472, 477 (1961).

"7E.g., BOULDER II at 223-25; Sacks, Education for Professional Responsibility in the
Law Schools, in PROCEEDINGS, ASHEVILLE CONFERENCE OF LAW SCHOOL DEANS ON EDUCATION
FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 4 (1966); Brickman, Contributions of Clinical Programs
to Trainingfor Professionalism,4 CONN. L. REv. 437 (1971-72). But see Simon, An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Some CurriculumInnovations in Law Schools, 2 J. OF APPLIED
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 219 (1966), in SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 573 (R. Simon ed. 1968).
"See generally BOULDER II at 223-68 for articles discussing the pros and cons of clinical
education as a vehicle for education for professional responsibility.
"See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
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a law school is to have a meaningful professional responsibility
program, the faculty must be committed to the idea that law

school is the necessary and proper forum for professional responsibility education. Of course everyone agrees that lawyers ought to
be ethical. We are all for virtue and against sin. In the minds of
many legal educators, professional responsibility issues are not
legal issues but practice-related issues, and therefore are not
within the scope of law school legal education. There is an attitude that law schools should teach law and leave matters of ethics
and morality to the bar, the church, individual conscience, or
others.40

What then are the justifications for allocating more than
nominal resources to the teaching of professional responsibility?
A.

Professionalism

No matter what else we may think a law school ought to be,
the fact is that it is primarily and fundamentally a professional
school. For the overwhelming majority of its graduates, its principal function is to prepare them to enter the legal profession.4'
Therefore, we cannot ignore professional responsibility matters
by use of the fiction that we merely teach law and award law
degrees, claiming indifference to the use which is made of those
degrees following graduation:
We are educating students to be lawyers-not law students. As
a result, it is the legal profession and the public-rather than the
law schools-which suffer if there is a deficiency in education for the
law. 2

Once we admit that certain components of professional responsibility can be the subject of law school instruction, we must
determine the nature and extent of the law school's obligation to
the profession it serves. If we take this obligation seriously, as we
must, is it not fatuous for us to teach extensively the rules of law
and the skills necessary for manipulating them while at the same
time virtually ignoring the professional milieu in which the lawyer must work? Justice Stone, at the dedication of the University
of Michigan Law Quadrangle, stated:
From the beginning the law schools have steadily raised their intellectual standards. It is not too much to say that they have worshipped the proficiency which they have sought and attained to a
"See Chadbourn, supra note 21.
"See note 4 supra.
"2Malone, supra note 7, at 11.
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remarkable degree. But there is grave danger to the public if this
proficiency be directed wholly to private ends without thought of the
social consequences, and we may well pause to consider whether the
professional school has done well to neglect so completely the inculcation of some knowledge of the social responsibility which rests
upon a public profession. . . . I have no thought that men are made
moral by mere formulations of rules of conduct. . . . But men serve
causes because of their devotion to them. . . . It is not beyond the
power of institutions which have so successfully mastered the art of
penetrating all the intricacies of legal doctrine to impart a truer
understanding of the functions of those who are to be its servants."

It is difficult to understand the attitude of those legal educators who seem to feel that to teach about professionalism in law
school is somehow undignified or ignoble. Rather, the opposite is
true. Pervasion of the curriculum with concepts of professionalism enhances the status of the law school by emphasizing the
distinctions between it and other schools which merely prepare
students for entry into a trade or business.
B.

Ethics and Substantive Law
Pervasive consideration of many ethical problems in certain
courses can be an important adjunct to the learning of the law.
Some substantive and procedural rules cannot be fully understood or critically analyzed without a simultaneous consideration
of the ethical context in which the lawyer is operating. A student
cannot be taught to "think like a lawyer" without some appreciation for all of the elements which may affect the solution of a
given legal problem."
C.

Ethics and Law Reform
Sometimes rules or subsystems of law in actual operation,
particularly in an adversary context, give rise to ethical problems
which in turn may be part of the justification for law reform."5 For
example, many of the reasons advanced for the adoption of "nofault" automobile insurance plans are premised upon the alleged
existence of widespread violations of professional ethics inherent
in the present tort system." Conversely, proposals for law reform
which appear sound from the standpoint of the law alone may
have deleterious ethical side effects which should lessen the desirThe Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1934).
"Weinstein, supra note 29, at 461-63.
"Id. at 466-67.
"See J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSURANCE
(1971).
43Stone,
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ability of that particular plan and stimulate the search for a
better alternative. Certain law reforms, such as facilitating the
access of poorer citizens to legal remedies, are presently being
advanced in furtherance of the public responsibilities of the
profession.47
Thus, proposals for law reform often cannot be understood or
evaluated without full consideration of the ethical, as well as the
legal, effects of the present or proposed law.
D.

Law School as a Socializing Process
Whether we intend it to or not, the entire law school experience serves as the primary socializing influence upon law students." It is natural for law students, most of whom have had no
opportunity to learn about the legal profession from personal experience, to view the law school as a model, at least in terms of
the issues and attitudes which are important to the profession. In
other words, law students come to law school expecting it to
transform them from laymen into lawyers. They expect socialization as well as law. Thus, if they see professional responsibility
issues as unimportant to the law school, they may tend to adopt
the same attitude. 9 If we wish our students to believe that professional responsibility issues are significant in their professional
lives, we must address these issues at some time in the curriculum. Occasional exhortations to "do good" are not enough, and
may actually be worse than useless if students see such statements as hypocritical.
E.

The Necessity of FormalProfessionalResponsibilityInstruction
There are those who suggest that today's law graduates,
being bright and eager, can use a "common sense" approach to
matters of professional responsibility. However, upon even minimal reflection, it ought to be obvious that an intuitive approach
to resolving problems of professional responsibility is totally
inadequate.
Clearly, many legal ethics issues are not self-evident, and
many ethical problems and conflicts cannot be resolved optimally
"Examples might include the creation of special small claims courts and procedures
by which persons may proceed without the need for attorneys, and proposals for "no-fault,
do-it-yourself" divorces.
"Malone, The Lawyer and His Professional Responsibilities,17 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
191, 197 (1960).
"See notes 68 and 69 infra and accompanying text.
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without some prior training or experience in wrestling with such
issues. For example, would it be self-evident to a young lawyer
that he should not make direct contact with an opposing party
who is represented by counsel? Or would he know how to go about
resolving the dilemma presented by the client who has relevant
evidence which the law requires to be disclosed to the court or to
opposing counsel, but which the client instructs the lawyer to
conceal? Indeed, the same justification exists for teaching professional responsibility as for teaching any other course in law
school.5 0 It prepares one to recognize the issues inherent in a set
of undifferentiated facts and gives one some practice in solving
problems in a hypothetical context. Perhaps the justification for
studying professional responsibility per se is stronger than for
studying any other single subject because of the pervasiveness of
professional responsibility problems throughout all areas of the
law.
F. If Not During Law School, When?
Given the fact that most law graduates enter professional
roles, and the fact that members of the legal profession, of necessity, must learn to deal with professional responsibility issues,
when should this learning take place-during law school or after?
In the law school setting, professional responsibility can be examined systematically and objectively."' Various alternative solutions to professional responsibility problems can be studied and
tested rationally and without the built-in biases, pressures, or
conflicts of interest which the assumption of a particular occupational role may induce. A variety of relevant source materials can
be brought to the student's attention while professorial guidance
52
is still available.
IlI.

ALTERNATIVES TO A PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM

What are the alternatives to learning systematically about
professional responsibility in law school?
One possibility would be to leave these matters largely to
self-education in practice. For several reasons this is a rather
naive and unrealistic approach. Is it not unreasonable to assume
that a practicing lawyer will voluntarily undertake to research
professional responsibility issues which he encounters in his dayWatson, supra note 24.
JId.
"See BOULDER II at 359-401, which includes a list of most of the available course
materials.
5
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to-day work (not to mention those he does not even recognize)?
The extremely tight schedules of most lawyers in practice, coupled with the unlikelihood of an immediate external reward or
punishment for right or wrong answers, produce strong disincentives to adequate learning." If only the most flagrant misconduct
is customarily punished, since by definition the wrongful act
must be gross and obvious, there is little reason to undertake
independent study. This is equally true of obligations to clients,
other lawyers, the courts, the profession, and the public. As we
have seen before, a "common sense" approach to these issues is
patently inadequate because the issues themselves are not, in
most cases, self-revealing. Even if the issue is discoverable, the
best answer is not necessarily obtainable by common sense reasoning. In addition, the nature of professional responsibility obligations is such that often there is no adversary likely to call
attention to violations, and the client is not likely to be willing
to pay for his lawyer's self-education on issues of professional
responsibility.
Given the current status of lawyer disciplinary processes
(which, however, are improving), a mere reading of reports of
disbarments and suspensions is not likely to provide an adequate
education as to the full scope and extent of the lawyer's ethical
obligations. 51 Certainly in this area experience is not the best
teacher-if the lawyer goes so far as to incur the wrath of the
disciplinary process, its terrible swift sword need fall only once,
after which the ex-lawyer need no longer concern himself with
professional responsibility matters at all.
Some have suggested that professional responsibility be
taught in preparation for the bar examination. The inadequacy
of this approach is also obvious. Professional responsibility obligations will be studied then, if at all, only in a perfunctory way,
and study will be limited to the transactional rules. The amount
sBradway, supra note 3, at 352.
"See Wirtz, supra note 21, at 462:
The current law of disbarment indicates with disheartening clarity that
the profession is today so constituted as to be unable or at least unwilling to
purge the "shyster" from its ranks. Others have suggested that so far as
teaching law students legal ethics is concerned a few good disbarments would
do the job nicely.
See also 0. PHmLPS & P. McCoy, supra note 12, at 207-08; Pirsig, A Traditional Course
in Professional Responsibility, in BOULDER IH at 75, 83-84. But cf. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966).
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of study will be limited by its goal, which is to pass the one
question on the bar examination dealing with legal ethics.5
What about bar association and continuing legal education
programs or publications? These are unlikely to do an adequate
job as they reach only a small minority of the bar, most of whom
are among those least in need of such education. Practicing lawyers tend to become cynical about ethics problems and are more
likely than law students to view such instruction as "preaching"
and tune out."6 Publications can be freely ignored, especially
those parts which cover unfamiliar ground or which deal with
matters having no immediate economic impact on the lawyer's
current affairs. Moreover, the professional responsibility content
of continuing legal education programs has been miniscule. 7 Programs dealing solely with professional responsibility issues are
noteworthy both for their scarcity and for the fact that lawyers
have stayed away from them in droves.58
In spite of admonitions to include more professional responsibility material pervasively throughout continuing legal education
courses, 5 the amount of such material actually taught has been
pitifully small.
Attempts to educate practicing lawyers on matters of professional responsibility may thus be characterized as too little too
late. 1
IV.

A PROGRAM FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EDUCATION

A major reason-probably the most important reason-for
the overall inadequacy of law school instruction in professional
responsibility is that most law schools have neither a master plan
for incorporating such material into the curricular and cocurricular program of the school, nor a person responsible for
5'0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoy, supra note 12, at 30-33, 39; Bradway, supra note 3, at 353.

'See Watson, supra note 24, at 165.

"See BOULDER II at 313-24.
'See id. at 53, 313-24. One course with which the author is familiar was scheduled as
a part of the Chicago Bar Association Continuing Legal Education Program. It had to be
cancelled when, a few days before the scheduled date, there were only six registrants-four
of whom were from the law office of one of the speakers.
"See BOULDER II at 313-24; A.B.A.-A.L.I. Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education, Broadeningof ContinuingLegal Education Urged by Second Arden House Conference, 50 A.B.A.J. 136 (1964); Mathews, Book Review, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 535 (1961).
"See Weckstein, A Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics-Evaluated,
33 TENN. L. REv. 176-77 (1966); Mathews, Foreword to J. STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PuBuc RESPONSIBILITY at 3 (1959).
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preparing or implementing such a plan. What is everyone's business is no one's. By definition, law teachers are concerned about
the law. Those things which do not press themselves upon the
consciousness are of necessity ignored, and most law teachers
have little reason to think about professional responsibility issues. Law teachers share concerns about law with practicing lawyers, but rarely deal with issues of professionalism.
Much has been written about the various methods of bringing professional responsibility materials into the law schoolpervasive infusion into law and perspective courses, a course on
the legal profession, lectures and other cocurricular programs,
and clinical programs. 1 Most agree that some sort of mix of
these methods is best..2
The real problem is to translate these ideas into action and
to coordinate the presentation of these materials in order to insure comprehensiveness without waste or duplication. To do this
the law school needs to have one person to plan and oversee the
entire professional responsibility program of the school-a
"guardian ad educatum." The "guardian's" professional responsibility education duties would include the following:
(1) To make a study of the abundant literature on
the subject of professional responsibility education and
to develop a master plan for a comprehensive program
of such education at that school. History teaches that
no one method has been found to be superior to any
other. There is still room for experimentation, and each
faculty will have its own ideas as to the techniques it
considers to be most appropriate. At the same time, the
literature bears witness to a great deal of experience,
which every faculty should consider.
(2) To present the plan to the faculty, obtain their
input, make revisions, and secure endorsement of the
final plan; and
(3) To oversee the implementation of the total plan
and its component parts.
One especially important function which this person can perform is to educate and raise the consciousness of the other mem6

See generally BouLDER II, and especially the bibliography at 359-401.
"See generally BOULDER HI, and especially Weckstein, A CoordinatedApproach, in
BOULDER H at 188.
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bers of the faculty in order to expand the use of the pervasive
method and to increase the instances of faculty-student communication on these issues. 3 He might arrange a short faculty conference on education for professional responsibility to discuss possible assigned readings and to coordinate by agreement the responsibilities of various teachers for pervasive coverage of the
widest possible range of substantive professional responsibility
problems. A side benefit of this faculty involvement would be an
increased faculty awareness of the role of the law teacher as an
attitude model.
This "guardian" should have ongoing responsibility for a periodic review of the school's professional responsibility program
to determine its success and defects. Periodic testing of students
to find out if they have learned this material and if their attitudes
have changed might be included.
In most schools, the program will include a course or seminar
devoted entirely to professional responsibility. Many (but by no
means all) law schools now offer such courses," but, in general,
they have been less than a total success. Difficulties include lack
of student motivation, less-than-complete teacher credibility,
and less-than-adequate quality and coverage. 5 Most writers have
concluded that the quality and value of such a course is directly
proportional to the teacher's enthusiasm for the subject.6 It
should come as no surprise to learn that those who have been
dragged, kicking and screaming, into the classroom to teach this
course have usually had less than satisfactory results. Conversely,
those teachers who have a missionary zeal for the subject do not
have problems with student motivation, course quality, and the
like.
It is not difficult to understand why most regular members
of the full-time teaching faculty are less than excited about teaching this course. It takes only a short period of experience in law
teaching to discover that most of the awards honoris causa, and
the fringe benefits that go with them, are handed out to those who
excel in teaching and writing about law. In the long run, time
6

See Smedley, The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale--"The Vanderbilt
Experiment," 15 J. LEGAL ED. 435 (1963).
"See note 5 supra.
"See BOULDER II at 39-111; L. LAMBORN, supra note 5.
"See, e.g., Thoron, A Course in the Dynamics of Professional Responsibility, in
BOULDER II at 88.
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spent on this course is likely to be counterproductive in terms of
one's teaching career.
There are, however, two groups of potential professional responsibility teachers who may well be enthusiastic about the
task. One likely candidate would be a practicing lawyer from the
community in which the law school is located. Many lawyers-especially graduates of the school in question-secretly
carry chalk in their briefcases. The glory of teaching one course
at old alma mater or a sister law school is a powerful form of
psychic income. Among these lawyers are a few who have excellent academic records and very good classroom demeanor, and
are sufficiently conscientious and dependable to teach a first-rate
course with proper guidance. Surely it would not be difficult to
find one or more qualified lawyers with high professional standards and a real concern about professional responsibility issues.
The use of an adjunct faculty member for this course has
several advantages. First, it is not a drain on the work and resources of the existing faculty. Second, it is less expensive to the
law school. The services of a practicing lawyer can be obtained
for far less than the total cost of half the teaching time of a regular
member of the faculty. Third, the course could be offered more
frequently-every semester or quarter and perhaps even in the
summer-enabling it to reach a larger number of students and
thus underlining its importance. (If the course is to be required
for graduation, such additional offerings will usually be necessary.) Fourth, it eliminates the credibility gap which may exist
if the course is taught by a regular member of the faculty." The
practicing lawyer can draw upon his immediate experience for
course material, making it more real and alive, something the law
professor usually cannot do. Fifth, students will perceive that at
least some segments of the bar are concerned about professional
responsibility problems; in other words, the lawyer will serve as
a positive role model.
On the negative side, the problem with using adjunct faculty
for this or any other course is that practicing lawyers sometimes
have a tendency to be out of touch with the school's educational
goals, and may not understand what needs to be done to develop
the course as it ought to be. This is where a second potential
instructor comes in.
"7See Mathews, A Problem Approach, in BOULDER H at 70-71; Starrs, supra note 3.
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The various deans in the law school-"The Dean," and the
associate and assistant deans-often wish to have some teaching
function but may not have the time or inclination to develop a
particular substantive course. One or more of them may have a
special interest in professional responsibility matters, particularly because deans often are brought into direct contact with bar
associations, judges, bar admission committees, and others who
sometimes ask embarrassing questions about professional responsibility training in the law school. Indeed, many legal educators
will intuitively deem professional responsibility matters most
appropriate for decanal concern.
If there is a dean ready, willing, and able to do so, why not
have the professional responsibility course team-taught by him or
her and the practicing lawyer described above? Such dean might
also be the logical person to be chosen as the law school's professional responsibility coordinator. In this way, the practicing lawyer would provide the expertise, realism, enthusiasm, and most
of the work for the course, while the dean would insure that the
course approach and coverage were appropriate to the law
school's overall program. Thus, the course would be assured of
having both the necessary academic and practical components.
Of course, the academic member of the teaching team need
not be a dean if there is another member of the faculty interested
in this subject. The use of the team-teaching device with the
primary burden of the course resting on the practicing lawyer
would enable an interested member of the regular faculty to participate with a relatively minor expenditure of his own time, making the course much more attractive to a law teacher with an
interest in the subject.
The team-teaching concept has been used successfully in
other subjects where instructors with different backgrounds each
make a unique contribution to the course by virtue of their own
special experience and expertise. The nature of education for professional responsibility is such that it is particularly appropriate
for the team-teaching device.
CONCLUSION

Law schools traditionally have faced outward to the profession as well as inward toward the academy. Today it is more
important than ever that this dual stance be maintained. As legal
institutions and the profession itself face new challenges and
demands, tomorrow's lawyers must be especially well prepared to
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respond affirmatively and effectively to the changing needs of the
consumers of legal services. Lawyers must understand who they
are and what the traditional responsibilities of their profession
have been, before they can make intelligent decisions on these
issues, both for the present and the future. The law school can
and must educate them about professionalism, for all other
means of such education are inadequate.
There are many ways to accomplish this education. Some
have been mentioned in passing here, and these and others are
extensively discussed in the literature. However, professional responsibility education at each law school will be no better than
the personal and corporate commitment of the faculty to such a
program. In particular, law teachers must be sensitive to their
role as model lawyers. 8 By hiring a teacher and placing him in
front of a classroom, the law school implicitly represents that he
is at least an acceptable prototype of a lawyer. It is true, of course,
that law teachers try to instill an independence of thought in their
students. But we cannot escape the fact that the minds of law
students are blank slates so far as the issues of professionalism
are concerned. Our attitudes will tend to become their attitudes,
and the greatest danger is that we will communicate too little."
To ignore professional responsibility is to say to the student that
it is not a real professional problem, or that the issues are so basic
that they are self-evident. Neither is true:
The role of the law teacher as a psychological conveyer of attitudes also appears to be of crucial importance. Students new to a
field are generally impressionable with reference to the facts and the
views of that field. The attitudinal overtones which an instructor
reflects or deliberately asserts in his elucidation of methods and
points of law provide cues to the student in how to value the methods and findings that are the primary substance of learning. A cynical or disinterested instructor can make his attitude felt and important to a student just developing an orientation toward law and legal
work. If the identification of student and instructor is a strong
one-that is, if the student's psychological as well as intellectual
needs are well-nourished by the instructor-the transfer of attitude
may prove intractable to time and other influences. A whole faculty,
generally disposed to the completely rationalistic view of law, for
example, cannot help but present an imposing force of influence on
UE. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREEr LAWYER 265-66 (1964); Cheatham, supra note 2, at 719;
Thurman, supra note 3, at 68-69; Weinstein, supra note 29, at 455-59.
"See Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the ProfessionalEthics
of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 587, 598 (1969).
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the molding of attitudes, modes of analysis, and choice of judgments
of students. 0

Surely professional training which assumes that the professional will learn all he needs to know about his profession and its
ethics-however broadly or narrowly defined-by trial and error
in the marketplace is totally inadequate. Such education inevitably will be incomplete and warped.
Law schools as institutions have a responsibility to their profession, not merely to train legal carpenters, but to prepare their

graduates for the professional status which the law degree implies-men and women who understand that they are entrusted

with the design, construction, and maintenance of a cathedral.
That responsibility is abdicated only at the risk of becoming less
than lawyer schools, which carries with it the corresponding risk
that lawyering will become less than a profession.
The raw material exists by which the law school can fashion

a comprehensive program for the infusion of professionalism into
the life of the school. All that is needed is the commitment to that
goal and the effective delegation of responsibility to ensure that
a concrete program is developed and brought into being.

Again, the words of Elliott Cheatham, although written 40
years ago, are fully appropriate today:
Let us make this work an integral part of our wider study of law.
We have been engaged in examining afresh almost every element of
law, except the profession that administers the law-the profession
in which our graduates will be engaged through life. Many of these
other elements of law can better spare university study than can the
profession itself. The zeal of the lawyer in advancing his clients'
interests is constantly modifying the substantive law, and as a
means to this modification much excellent study is devoted by lawyers and by laymen. But a study of the bar itself can scarcely be
hoped for by the active bar, and cannot be carried on with understanding by laymen who do not know the difficulties involved. As I
have already said, it must be made by those whose training gives
them understanding of the work of the bar and whose work does not
inevitably incline them to uphold its inherited position.
This is a propitious time for action. Depression and want in the
midst of plenty have caused wide re-examination of our institutions.
Important political and economic and social changes seem in the
making, and our students will have a hand in the making. Law
reform and professional changes have often gone along with these
7
"Eron & Redmount, The Effect of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 431,
442 (1957). See also Thurman, supra note 3, at 69-70.
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broader movements. One of our successors, writing from the vantage
point of the year 2000, may say ... that the greatest change in law
administration was an improvement in the tone of the profession.
May he add, the law schools had their full share in achieving the
change.7
7

Cheatham, supra note 2, at 720-21.

